Rethinking education choices: The effect of surveys by FACCHINELLO, Luca et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School of Economics School of Economics
5-2017
Rethinking education choices: The effect of surveys
Luca FACCHINELLO
Singapore Management University, lfacchinello@smu.edu.sg
Juanna Schroter JOENSEN
Gregory Francisco VERAMINDI
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2961116
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research_all
Part of the Education Economics Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Economics at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School of Economics by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at
Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
FACCHINELLO, Luca; JOENSEN, Juanna Schroter; and VERAMINDI, Gregory Francisco. Rethinking education choices: The
effect of surveys. (2017). Research Collection School of Economics.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research_all/7
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2961116 
Rethinking Education Choices:
The Effect of Surveys
Luca Facchinello∗
Juanna Schrøter Joensen‡
Gregory Francisco Veramendi§
– VERY PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE DRAFT –
latest version here
Abstract
Can surveys affect human capital investments? This paper examines
whether individual education choices and outcomes are affected by a
survey posing questions related to expectations and forward-looking
behavior. We have administrative data for the whole Swedish popula-
tion to which an extensive education survey was administered to ran-
domly drawn samples of 3rd graders. This constitutes a randomized
social experiment for testing whether responding to survey questions
alters behavior. We observe complete educational and labor market
histories until the individuals are 31-41 years old. We have exoge-
nous variation in the timing of first surveys and when an additional
survey was administered to parents. The causal effect of the survey
on both short- and long-term outcomes is generally not significantly
different from zero. We find, however, that being surveyed increases
educational attainment and job stability in the early career for those
with low parental education. We also assess heterogeneity in estimated
causal effects in order to get at potential mechanisms. The patterns
indicate the importance of increased awareness.
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1 Introduction
Empirical work in the social and health sciences depends crucially on the
use of survey data. Surveying individuals may draw their attention to risks,
returns, or choices previously not salient to them. This may change their
subsequent behavior. If so, it may bias parameter estimates and any con-
clusions drawn from survey data. In this paper, we assess whether surveys
can causally affect educational investments. We also assess for whom and
how surveys can change education choices and outcomes.
Does responding to a survey designed to evaluate own performance in
school and reflect on future education opportunities cause individuals to re-
think their educational choices? We answer this question by linking survey
data to comprehensive administrative data for the whole Swedish popula-
tion. The extensive education survey was administered to a randomly drawn
sample of three cohorts of 3rd graders in the 80s and early 90s. The survey
thus constitutes a randomized social experiment for testing whether reflect-
ing on survey questions alters behavior. We observe education and labor
market outcomes until individuals are 31-41 years old. Importantly, these
are from administrative registers and not reported by the individuals them-
selves. This means that (i) measurement error is minimal in our data, (ii)
we can conduct balancing tests on a rich set of pre-determined characteris-
tics of surveyed and non-surveyed individuals to corroborate the success of
random assignment, and (iii) we can analyze the impact of the survey on
both shorter- and longer-term outcomes.
If being surveyed changes behavior, then it has implications for both
the external and internal validity of studies based on survey data. The to-
tal “treatment” effect of being surveyed is thus interesting per se. Most
countries administer Household and Labor Force Surveys (LFS). Much of
the research on education, labor market, household finance, health, and re-
tirement choices is based on survey data. For example, the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) which is a longitudinal household survey which
began in 1968 with a nationally representative sample of US households,
and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) and 1997
(NLSY97). These surveys comprise samples of the cohorts born in 1957-64
(1980-84) and respondents were aged 14-22 (12-17) when first interviewed
in 1979 (1997). The construction of these panel surveys has been crucial
for many of the recent methodological advances in microeconometrics and
applied microeconomics more generally. The empirical issues of dealing with
measurement error and validation have been extensively studied.1 The fact
that repeated surveying can alter individual survey response patterns has
also been well-established. For example, related to the monthly Current
Population Survey (CPS) rotation group bias and its impact on unemploy-
1See e.g. Bound et al. (2001) for an extensive survey of the literature.
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ment estimates (Bailar, 1975; Solon, 1986). However, whether responding
to surveys can actually alter behavior is still an open question. The only
study we know of (Duflo et al., 2011) finds mixed evidence. Duflo et al.
(2011) randomly assign individuals in five field experiments (three on health
and two on micro-lending) to respond to survey questions on health and/or
household finance. They find that responding to health-related questions
significantly altered health-related behavior. Those randomized to take the
health survey had significantly higher take-up of medical insurance and in-
creased use of water treatment products. They also find that this leads to
biased estimates of their estimated impact of improved water source quality
- despite random assignment to higher water source quality. These results
indicate that researchers should be cautious when administering extensive
and repeated surveys, since they may alter the estimated treatment effects
of those surveyed by changing their behavior. However, these results seem
to be context-dependent.
This paper differs from Duflo et al. (2011) in five important aspects.
First, we merge the random survey sample to administrative data for the
whole Swedish population. Our sample size is therefore much larger and the
measurement errors in education choices and outcomes are minimal. Second,
we analyze the effect of being surveyed in a developed (rather than devel-
oping) country. Third, we examine the domain of education (rather than
health and lending). This is important if impacts are context-specific. For
example, if survey effects only arise in settings where individuals previously
ignored some of their potential choices and opportunities (e.g. enrolling in
high school or college). In such settings, the survey can make these choices
more salient, divert the focus to rethink priors, and spur individuals to take
otherwise missed opportunities (e.g. more rewarding educational paths).
Fourth, we have access to complete medical birth records and a range of
measures of family composition and resources to conduct balancing tests
of pre-determined characteristics of surveyed and non-surveyed individuals.
Lastly, we are able to follow individuals for 18-21 years after random sur-
vey assignment. This allows us to analyze both shorter- and longer-term
outcomes, which is important if the strength of the effect of being surveyed
diminishes or amplifies over time.
Surveys may affect education choices through providing information to
rethink education choices and potentially change expectations. Our paper
is therefore also related to the literature analyzing the effects of informa-
tion on the returns to investment in education. Jensen (2010) finds that his
sample of 8th grade boys in the Dominican Republic significantly underes-
timate the returns to schooling. Informing a random subset of them about
higher measured returns leads to a significant increase in perceived returns
and 0.20-0.35 more years of schooling. Similarly, Nguyen (2008) finds that
informing a random subset of primary school students in rural Madagas-
car about the average returns to schooling increased their attendance rates
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by 3.5 percentage points and their test scores by 0.2 standard deviations
on average. Students whose priors were below the informed average re-
turn, had an even higher increase in test scores of 0.37 standard deviations.
These studies analyze short-term effects of providing specific information
on the population distribution of the returns to education on educational
attainment four months (Nguyen, 2008) to four years later (Jensen, 2010).
Relatedly, Wiswall and Zafar (2015) estimate the effects of providing infor-
mation on college major-specific characteristics on major choice during the
college years, and Jalava et al. (2015) estimate the effects of information
on test assessment on immediate test effort and performance. In this paper,
we are also able to access longer term effects on completed schooling and
realized labor market returns.
The “treatment” of being surveyed is a bundle of different types of infor-
mation. This means that there are several potential channels through which
the survey can affect education choices. We try to disentangle these chan-
nels exploiting variation in respondents, questions, and timing of questions.
Three potential channels are: First, the children need to evaluate themselves
and their abilities - also relative to their peers’ abilities. They also take one
or multiple cognitive aptitude tests. Even if they are not informed of their
test scores, the test situation may still convey information to those in the
tails; e.g. if they could not reach the end of the test, were not able to an-
swer many test items, or finished before their peers and confidently solved
all test items. Second, the survey required them to state their preferences;
e.g. their desired occupation and spell out their future education plans.
This can be seen as a “nudge” to rethink and evaluate goals (i.e. desired
education and jobs), means, and costs in a forward-looking manner.2 This
could lead to more well-considered choices and less “mismatch” between in-
dividual abilities, education, and career choices.3 Third, the survey could
increase awareness or the salience of choices not previously considered. The
education system and institutional setting may not be clear to the child and
the parents. Particularly, the connection between early academic choices
and the tracked school system. There may also be an informational asym-
metry in that parents with higher education may be better informed than
parents who dropped out of school after compulsory schooling. The sur-
2In the survey wave the year after compulsory schooling completion (10th grade) they are
also asked how they made their education choices of elective courses and how they decided
to enroll in high school or not. This is also “nudging” them to evaluate the optimality of
their past choices. Some who may otherwise have dropped out after compulsory schooling
may thus decide to enroll in high school after having stopped out of school for a year or
two.
3Several studies find considerable uncertainty about abilities and room for learning through
grades and other feedback in education (Altonji, 1993; Arcidiacono, 2004; Arcidiacono et
al., 2011, 2012; Zafar, 2011; Facchinello, 2016). More information on educational tracks
may also improve outcomes in terms of more sorting on test scores across high school
tracks and less dropout (Goux et al., 2014).
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vey asks for reflection on these education choices, including continuing to
high school and college. This information could affect choices by increasing
awareness of choices not previously considered; especially for parents who
never themselves took these educational paths. If so, this has substantive
implications for how to model educational choices. Limited attention mod-
els, where individuals simplify complex choice settings by only considering a
limited subset of choices, have existed at least since Simon (1955).4 However,
such models have not yet been considered in the context of human capital
accumulation and education choice. Fourth, parents also respond to ques-
tions about school inputs, school choices, and how much of their time they
devote to their children – in particular to their schooling investments. This
could lead parents to invest more time in their children’s skill accumulation
and schooling.5
We shed light on the potential channels by assessing heterogeneity
in treatment effects estimated under different identifying assumptions (a
within-municipality, a within-school, and two between-school estimators)
across subgroups with different levels of parental education.
The causal effect of being surveyed on both short- and long-term out-
comes is generally not significantly different from zero, independently of
parental education. We find, however, that being surveyed increases ed-
ucational attainment and job stability in the early career for some sub-
populations. We will try to disentangle the mechanisms by examining
whether it makes a difference when and who is surveyed - in 6th grade
or also in 3rd grade, the children themselves or also their parents. First,
we have variation in when children responded to the survey, whether and
when parents also responded to the survey, and in the type and intensity of
survey questions. Second, we are able to merge data on siblings in order to
estimate potential information spillover effects. Siblings who were not di-
rectly affected by the survey, could only be affected if there are information
spillovers through social interaction with their siblings and parents – a po-
tentially important determinant of educational choice (Joensen and Nielsen,
2015). We will exploit that the parent is surveyed when their non-surveyed
children (i.e. the siblings of the surveyed child) are at different stages of
their educational paths. Some older siblings may be about to make critical
decisions on whether to enroll in high school or in college. Therefore, the
importance of education may become particularly salient for these siblings
4See e.g. Barberis and Thaler (2003) and DellaVigna (2009) for reviews on contexts in
finance and economics where limited attention has been found important.
5More parental involvement in their child’s schooling is found to improve their child’s, and
even their child’s peers’, school attendance (Avvisati et al., 2014). Cunha et al. (2010)
find that measured parental investments account for 15% of the variation in educational
attainment. Heckman and Mosso (2014) provide a recent comprehensive review of this
emerging literature.
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as the parent reflects on career choices.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: the next section spells out
the details of the institutional setting, survey sampling scheme, and how
we exploit these in our empirical strategy. Section 3 presents the data,
descriptive statistics, and balancing tests. Section 4 presents the results,
while Section 5 concludes.
2 Institutional Setting and Empirical Strategy
This section first provides some background on the institutional setting and
the Swedish schooling system the surveyed individuals and their cohorts
were facing. Second, we describe the sampling scheme of the Evaluation
Through Follow-up (ETF) cohort-sequential longitudinal survey. Third, we
describe the empirical strategy we use to identify the effect of surveys on
education choice.
2.1 Survey Sampling Scheme
The ETF survey was administered by the Department of Education and
Special Education, Gothenburg University, in collaboration with Statistic
Sweden.6 The survey was constructed through a multistage sampling scheme
with stratification at the municipal level: (1) systematically draw two mu-
nicipalities at random per stratum (13 strata) plus the three largest munic-
ipalities (Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmo¨), (2) randomly draw classes
within sampled municipalities, and (3) survey all students in each sampled
class.
More specifically, the survey sample selection design was as follows.
In stage (1) the three largest municipalities (Stockholm, Gothenburg, and
Malmo¨) were selected with probability one, while the remaining 2817 Swedish
municipalities were categorized into 13 strata according to their popula-
tion (above or below 25,000 inhabitants), proportion of “socialist” mandates
(above or below 50%), the share employed in public administration (above
or below 25%), and the proportion of immigrant pupils (above or below
8%).8 Within each stratum, the municipalities were assigned a sampling
probability weight, pm, proportional to their share of pupils in the relevant
school cohort. Finally, two municipalities were sampled at random (condi-
tional on pm) from each stratum. Thus, a total of 29 municipalities were
sampled and larger municipalities were more likely to be sampled. Figure 1
displays a map of Sweden with each of the sampled municipalities in stage
(1) for each of the three cohorts.
6Ha¨rnqvist (1998) provides additional details on the construction of the survey.
7283 in the last wave.
8The exact procedure of selecting municipalities is extensively documented in Emanuelsson
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(a) 1972 cohort (b) 1977 cohort (c) 1982 cohort
Figure 1: Sampled municipalities
Note: The Figure displays a map of Sweden with the sampled municipalities in each
ETF-cohort 1972, 77, and 82, respectively, shaded in red.
In stage (2) Statistic Sweden’s (SCB) class register was used to ran-
domly sample classes: 3rd graders in the school-years 1981/82 (ETF72),
1986/87 (ETF77), and 1991/92 (ETF82). Unfortunately, these class reg-
isters have not been kept in SCB’s archives. This means that we can not
perfectly measure “treatment” and “control” group assignment, since we can
not perfectly measure who is in the “control” group: i.e. those who attended
3rd grade in the sampled municipalities in the same year, but were not in a
sampled class. The sample selection criteria for the classes were that: (2.i)
17 classes in each sampled municipality were selected at random, but with
the two exceptions that (2.ii) all classes in small municipalities with 17 or
fewer classes were sampled and (2.iii) 29 classes were selected at random in
the three largest municipalities (Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmo¨). The
class sampling was made in January in the relevant school-year (1981/82,
1986/87, and 1991/92).
In stage (3), all students registered in the sampled classes were surveyed
on April 15 in the relevant school-year, hence “treated”. The first two
(1979).
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cohorts (ETF72 and ETF77) were surveyed in 3rd, 6th, and 10th grade
(the year after compulsory schooling was finalized) whereas the last cohort
(ETF82) was only surveyed in 6th grade.9 The students’ parents were also
surveyed once: in 3rd grade for the first cohort (ETF72) and in 6th grade
for the last two cohorts (ETF77 and ETF82). Table 1 provides an overview
of the administered surveys and tests for each cohort.
Table 1: Treatment Assignment Overview
Parent Child Aptitude
survey survey test
3rd 6th 3rd 6th 10th 3rd 6th
1972 cohort T T T T T T
1977 cohort T T T T T
1982 cohort T T T
The Table displays an overview of the variation in treatment
assignment over grades for each of the three ETF-cohorts
1972, 77, and 82.
2.2 Control and Treatment Group Assignment
With the data we have, we try to make the best possible approximation to
the “control” group.
First, we select those who were in 9th grade in 1987/88, 1992/93,
1997/98. The two main drawbacks with this selection method is that it
assumes no grade retention and no students selecting in and out of classes
during the six-year period from grade 3 to grade 9. Students who may re-take
or skip a grade will be misclassified according to this assumption. However,
grade retention was extremely rare for these cohorts. We exclude those who
immigrated to Sweden after January 1 in the academic year they attended
grade 3, since those assigned the survey (i.e. the “treatment” group) will
by construction only include those who were registered in a Swedish school
at the time of random assignment. This restriction thus helps us balance
this dimension between the “treatment” and the “control” group. We also
have information on the municipality of birth as well as the municipality
of residency of the parents in December 1990 (when the ETF77 cohort at-
tended 7th grade) and in December 1991 (when the ETF82 cohort attended
3rd grade and was sampled). This allows us to almost perfectly measure
who was in the “control” group in the ETF82 cohort and more accurately
measure who was in the “control” group in the ETF77 cohort.
9Note that randomization also happened in 3rd grade for the ETF82 cohort despite them
not being surveyed until 6th grade.
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We discuss additional sample selection criteria and refinements to the
approximation of treatment and control groups in Sections 2.3 and 3.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
We now turn to describing the empirical strategies we use to identify the
effect of surveys on education choice. Particularly, how we exploit the survey
sampling scheme to identify the causal effect of being surveyed. This section
highlights how – despite successful randomization – we need to deal with
non-random sorting across units of randomization.
First, we simply compare the outcomes of those surveyed and those non-
surveyed within each municipality. This is given by the linear regression:
Yismc = δ0 + δ1Surveyismc + γm + εismc (1)
where Yismc is the educational outcome for individual i in school s in cohort
c and municipality m, Survey is an indicator for whether the individual was
surveyed, and γm is a municipality fixed effect. Given the survey sampling
scheme (cf. Section 2.1), δ1 can be interpreted as a causal effect of being
surveyed if (a) individuals, classes and schools are randomly sampled and
(b) there is full compliance as everyone assigned to the survey responded to
the survey. In other words, if individuals are neither assigned to sampled
classes nor refusing to respond to the survey based on the unobservables,
εismc, in (1) which affect the educational outcome of interest.
Second, we use both a within- and a between-school estimator to deal
with potential non-random sampling across schools as well as non-random
individual non-response. The within-school strategy is ideal if (a’) indi-
viduals and classes are randomly sampled within schools and (b) there is
full compliance in student survey response. Random assignment to classes
conditional on school (a’) is a more credible assumption than (a) if the
schools sampled are systematically different from the schools not sampled.
The between-school strategy also assumes (a) random sampling of schools
(and classes), but tries to get at potential violations of (b) non-random stu-
dent non-response by measuring “treatment” at the school level. However,
the benefit of not having to assume (b) comes at the cost of the estimated
treatment effect being attenuated towards zero.
The following two sub-sections are devoted to providing more details on
the within- and between-school estimators we apply. Overall, the empirical
strategies trade-off precision and bias in different ways by imposing different
identifying assumptions and measuring “survey treatment” at different unit
levels. We will discuss the threats to interpreting each of these “survey
effects” as causal in even more detail when presenting the data and empirical
results in Sections 3 and 4.
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2.3.1 Within-School
The within-school strategy simply compares the outcomes of individuals who
were in the treated classes to those who were in the control classes within
each school where some students were assigned to treatment. Figure 2 (a)
illustrates this identification strategy. Municipality A has three schools of
which three classes in School A and one class in School B are assigned to
treatment (marked with light shading). The within-school strategy essen-
tially compares the students in the three treated classes in School A to the
students in the four control group classes in School A and the students in the
treated class in School B to the students in the remaining three classes in
School B. In contrast, the within-municipality specification (1) simply com-
pares four treated classes in Municipality A with the nine control classes in
Municipality A. This distinction is important if there is significant sorting
across schools or if there are influential unobserved school-specific factors
affecting educational outcomes. The within-school estimates are given by
the linear regression:
Yismc = β0 + β1Surveyismc + γs + εismc (2)
where Yismc is the educational outcome for individual i in school s in co-
hort c and municipality m, Survey is an indicator for being assigned to
the survey when in 3rd grade, and γs is a school fixed effect. β1 can be
interpreted as the causal effect of being surveyed if treated classes are not
selected based on unobservables, εismc, in (2) that affect the educational out-
come. This seems reasonable based on the class selection criteria outlined
in Section 2.1. However, there are a few empirical issues we need to deal
with. First, we only partially observe class assignment in 3rd grade as it is
only observed for those who are assigned to treatment and comply. Thus
we need to impute 3rd grade school assignment by survey response and 9th
grade school.10 Second, there may be attrition due to some students moving
after randomization occurred. Third, some students may also have been in
a different class, school, municipality, or abroad at the time of randomiza-
tion but otherwise followed the sampled class. Fourth, many students switch
schools between 3rd and 9th grade simply because some schools specialize in
either younger or older grades. Fifth, some students (more realistically their
parents) might have opted out of the survey for privacy reasons. Therefore,
both student non-response and mobility between 3rd and 9th grade pose
threats to the identification of β1. In Section 3.2.1, we assess the credibility
of the identifying assumptions by testing for balance on a range of variables
determined pre-treatment. When possible, we also try to control for location
in 3rd grade and whether the student is foreign born in (2) – which seems
to be a good proxy for mobility.
10Section 3.1.1 provides more detail on the imputation of schools.
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(a) Within-School (b) Between-School
Figure 2: Within- and Between-School Variation in Treatment Assignment
Note: The Figure displays the two types of exogenous variation we exploit in the data.
The left panel (a) displays how we compare treated and control (light shading) units within
each school when employing the within-school identification strategy. The right panel (b)
displays how we compare schools who have some classes assigned to treatment and no
classes assigned to treatment, respectively, in the between-school identification strategy.
2.3.2 Between-Schools
To deal with some of the potential threats to identification of a causal sur-
vey effect using the simple and the within-school strategy, we also use a
between-school empirical strategy. To this end, we compare the outcomes of
individuals who were in ETF schools (i.e. schools where there was at least
one treated class) to those schools who did not have any classes assigned to
treatment. Figure 2 (b) illustrates this identification strategy. Municipality
A has three schools of which School A and School B are ETF schools (marked
with light shading) and School C is a non-ETF school. The between-school
strategy essentially compares the average outcomes of the students in the
two ETF schools (School A and School B) to the students in the non-ETF
school (School C ). The between-school estimates are given by the linear
regression:
Yismc = α0 + α1ETFschoolsmc + γm + εismc (3)
where ETFschoolsmc is an indicator for whether school s in municipality
m is an ETF school for individuals in cohort c. α1 can be interpreted as
the causal effect of being in a school where some students were surveyed. In
this sense, α1 can be thought of as an intent to treat effect (ITT). Causal
inference naturally rests on the assumption that schools are not sampled
based on student unobservables, εismc, in (3).
The main advantage of this between-school estimator is that there is
no need to impose assumptions on student survey non-response. There are
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two main drawbacks. First, as classes were systematically sampled bigger
schools are overrepresented within municipality, due to the fact that they
have more classes. This problem is particularly severe in small municipali-
ties, where the majority of classes were sampled. This induces a mechanical
bias, as small special schools are less likely to be assigned to the treatment.
This bias can be corrected controlling for school size or restricting the sam-
ple to municipalities where a non-trivial fraction of schools has been left out
of the sample (bigger municipalities). Second, some schools – particularly
larger schools – have few surveyed students. This means that the estimated
“survey effect” will be attenuated towards zero, since the average outcome
in “surveyed” ETF schools is an average over a few surveyed students and
many non-surveyed students. To accommodate this, we also estimate a
specification of (3) where we replace ETFschoolsmc with the fraction of stu-
dents in the school who were assigned to the survey, FractionSurveyedsmc.
This specification captures the intensity of treatment in each school, which
minimizes the attenuation bias. However, FractionSurveyedsmc may be
correlated with the number of students not responding to the survey. To
deal with this potential issue, we rather include the predicted fraction of
students surveyed in the school, ̂FractionSurveyedsmc, in (3). We predict
the number of classes sampled in each school by: First, using Maimonides’
rule (with a 30 students per class cap) for 9th grade enrollment to predict
the average class size.11 Second, given the number of students surveyed, ap-
proximate how many classes were sampled in each school. There were very
few cases in which whole classes did not comply to the survey assignment.
Thus, this specification of (3) should minimize selective non-response bias
while also providing a reasonable measure of the intensity of treatment at
the school level.
Finally, it should be noted that we assume no spillover effects on un-
treated units (i.e. individuals, classes, and schools) when making causal
inference throughout the paper. That is, we impose the stable unit treat-
ment value assumption (SUTVA) of any unit’s outcome being unaffected
by another unit’s treatment assignment. If this assumption does not hold
because there are spillovers from those surveyed to their non-surveyed peers
in the same school, then both the simple within-municipality (δ1) and the
within-school estimate (β1) of the “survey effect” may be attenuated towards
zero, while the between-school estimate (α1) will encompass these spillovers.
This attenuation bias will presumably be stronger for the within-school esti-
mate (β1) than for the within-municipality estimate (δ1). We can get a sense
of the presence and strength of potential spillovers by comparing the differ-
ent estimates. If there are strong spillovers on peers within schools, then
the “control classes” in the within-school strategy are partially “treated”.
11Several papers have used Maimonides’ rule to estimate the effect of class size on student
achievement (Angrist and Lavy, 1999) and long-term outomes (Fredriksson et al., 2013).
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This means that the estimated “survey effect” will be attenuated towards
zero as the average outcome of those in surveyed classes is compared to the
average outcomes of those not surveyed in the same school, but potentially
affected by their surveyed peers. For the between-school estimates, these
peer spillovers would work in the opposite direction by attenuating the es-
timated “survey effect” less towards zero, since they compare the average
outcomes in schools where some classes are assigned to the survey treat-
ment to the average outcomes in schools where no students are assigned to
treatment.
3 Data
In this section, we describe the data and the sample selection.
We merge the ETF survey data to several administrative registers via
the unique Swedish individual identifier. Our measures of educational choices
and outcomes originate from several registers administered by Statistics Swe-
den (SCB). We have detailed data on educational choices and outcomes from
the 9th grade registry (incl. grades in individual courses), the High School
registry (incl. grades in individual courses, grade point average (GPA),
track and specialization choices), and the Higher Education registry (incl.
detailed educational codes for all enrollment spells, course credits accumu-
lated during enrollment, and acquired degrees).
The Multigeneration registry allows us to link children to their par-
ents. It also contains information on family size and composition. Addi-
tional background variables are obtained from the longitudinal integration
database for health insurance and labour market studies (LISA) from which
we have yearly observations during the period 1990-2013. The parental
background variables we observe include age, civil status, highest completed
education, employment, earnings, and disposable family income. We supple-
ment this with earnings information from the Register Based Labor Market
Statistics (RAMS ) for the years 1986-89 and information on disposable fam-
ily income from the Income and Tax registry (IoT ) for the years 1978-89.
This means that we can measure disposable family income (parental earn-
ings) from birth (age 3) to age 31 for the youngest cohort and from age 6
(age 14) to 41 for the oldest cohort in our sample.
3.1 Sample Selection
We focus on the cohorts who completed compulsory schooling (9th grade)
in the school-years 1987/88, 1992/93, 1997/98. For children who followed
the ordained educational path, this corresponds to the cohorts born in 1972,
1977, and 1982. 95.99%, 95.48% and 5.18% of students ordained to graduate
from compulsory school grade 9 in 1988, 1993, 1998 were born in 1972, 1977,
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and 1982, respectively. For each birth cohort, we also focus exclusively on
the sampled municipalities.
For the samples used in the within- and between-school empirical strate-
gies, we further exclude those attending very small schools in 9th grade; i.e.
schools with a graduating cohort of 20 or fewer students. It is difficult to
make a reasonable ETF school imputation for these small schools, since we
do not know whether a few surveyed students switched to the school or
were part of a very small sampled class. This restriction only drops 0.6%,
0.7%, and 1.78% of the sample for the ETF72, ETF77, and ETF82 cohorts,
respectively.
3.1.1 ETF School Imputation
We observe which school everyone attends at the end of compulsory school-
ing; i.e. in 9th grade. However, we only observe earlier class and school
choices for those surveyed. In order to impute school status for the whole
sample – which we need for the within and between-school strategies – we
need to approximate how each observed 9th grade school corresponds to
each 3rd grade school. To this end, we use (class) school codes in (6th) 3rd
grade for those assigned to the survey for the (ETF72) ETF77 and ETF82
cohorts. These codes are linked to the school codes we observe for everyone
in 9th grade. The information on (class) school codes thus reveals how many
surveyed students in the same 3rd grade (class) school are also in the same
9th grade school. The details of the ETF school imputations are as follows:
ETF72 cohort. We use the information on classes in grade 6 to approxi-
mate whether the grade 9 school code corresponds to an ETF school. Note
that most students attend the same school in grades 6 and 9, but most stu-
dents change school from grade 3 to 9 (or the school code itself changes).
We impute ETF schools as follows: (i) For each grade 9 school code, sum
the number of students with each grade 6 class code, N6s . (ii) If there are at
least two students from a surveyed 6th grade class in the 9th grade school,
then we divide N6s by the total number of surveyed students in the 9th
grade school. This yields the fraction of students from the same 6th grade
class who also attend the same school in 9th grade. A high fraction means
that the 9th grade school was a destination school for those attending an
ETF school in 3rd grade. We assign ETF school status to the schools for
which this fraction was above 0.5. This changes assignment of 30 schools –
most of which are very small and drop out of the restricted sample in the
between-school analysis; see Sections 3.2 and 4.
ETF77 and ETF82 cohorts. Our imputation procedure is as follows: (i)
For each grade 9 school code, find the modal grade 3 school code. (ii) Sum
the number of students with the modal school code, N3s . (iii) Divide N
3
s
by the total surveyed students in the 9th grade school, s. For each grade
9 school code, this yields the fraction of students with the modal grade 3
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school code. (iv) Change school status if fewer than a third of students
are coming from the modal grade 3 school. This changes assignment status
for one school in the ETF77 cohort and 17 schools in the ETF82 cohort.
Note that the number of schools increases over time, but this does not affect
school assignments much.
Once control group students are matched up, we calculate the fraction
of surveyed students in each grade 9 school. We classify a school to be a non-
ETF school if: there are five or fewer surveyed students in the grade 9 school
and they represent at most 5% of the school. This changes status for 3, 62,
and 35 schools in the ETF72, ETF77, and ETF82 cohort, respectively.12
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 shows that survey response was high – initially above 90% – but
there was also some attrition as response rates fell by about 20 percentage
points over the seven year period from 3rd to 10th grade.
Table 2: Percentage of Students and Parents
Responding to the Survey
Child Survey Parent Survey
Grade 3 Grade 6 Grade 10 Grade 3 Grade 6
Cohort 1972 93 85 72 75 –
Cohort 1977 95 91 73 – 77
Cohort 1982 – 87 – – 75
Table 3 displays the number of students and schools in the sampled mu-
nicipalities. Around 80% of schools were sampled in the 72 and 82 cohorts,
while only 55% of schools were sampled for the 77 cohort. The fraction of
students sampled within each sampled school is also highest (38%) in the
72 cohort and lowest (26%) in the 77 cohort. Overall, the table shows that
there should be enough variation in survey assignment within-municipalities
to estimate (1) and within-schools to estimate (2).
To assure that there is enough variation between schools for the between-
school estimates of (3), we also conduct the analysis on a restricted sample
of municipalities where at most 85% of students are assigned to the survey
treatment. This retains mostly big municipalities; see Section 2.1 for details.
Table 4 presents the equivalent variation to Table 3 for this restricted sam-
ple. Naturally, both the fraction of sampled schools within the municipality
and the fraction of sampled students within each sampled school are lower
in this sample of larger municipalities and schools.
12Future versions of the paper will provide sensitivity analysis of the importance of the
chosen thresholds. We also intend to use Maimonides’ rule in order to exclude only
municipalities who had almost all classes sampled in expectation.
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Table 3: Students and Schools Sampled - Full Sample
Students
Sampled
Schools
Schools
Fraction in
Sampled Schools
Fraction Surveyed
in Sampled Schools
Cohort 1972 108.549 140 957 0.17 39.55
Cohort 1977 94.444 107 962 0.13 29.60
Cohort 1982 93.275 202 1112 0.22 33.00
Table 4: Students and Schools Sampled - Restricted Sample
Students
Sampled
Schools
Schools
Fraction in
Sampled Schools
Fraction Surveyed
in Sampled Schools
Cohort 1972 8.984 37 99 0.53 16.00
Cohort 1977 16.110 56 166 0.42 23.65
Cohort 1982 21.004 133 259 0.66 29.00
Sample restricted to municipalities where at least 85% of the students are not part of an EFT
school.
3.2.1 Balancing Tests
To corroborate the randomness of the sampling scheme, we perform a num-
ber of balancing tests on the pre-determined characteristics of the “treat-
ment” and “control” groups.
Tables A.1 to A.13 in Appendix A display the balancing tests for each
of the cohorts, under different sample restrictions, and for each of the four
empirical strategies. Each table displays control group means in the first
column. We also present three sets of balancing tests. First, regression tests
without and with controls. Second, standardized difference, the difference
between the treatment group mean and the control group mean of each
observed characteristic, X, scaled by the pooled variance.
The balancing tests indicate that assumption (b) in Section 2.3 of ran-
dom survey non-response is more of an empirical issue – especially for the 72
cohort and to some extent for the 82 cohort – as there are some systematic
and significant differences in observed characteristics between “treatment”
and “control” groups for the within-school strategy that are not present for
the between-school strategy. Particularly, having divorced parents and being
foreign born are predictive of group assignment. Students with disrupted
families might have been more likely to drop out of the survey. Being foreign
born presumably introduces issues of selective mobility affecting the within-
school “survey effect” estimate. To get a sense of how important selective
mobility may be, we also control for location in 3rd grade (when possible)
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and whether the student is foreign born in (2) – which seems to be a good
proxy for mobility.13 92%, 93%, and 95% of the students in the 72, 77, and
82 cohorts, respectively, remain in one of the sampled municipalities. Thus
mobility should not have a major impact on the analysis. Nevertheless, we
also perform the analysis on a restricted sample of Swedish born students
only. This improves balance on pre-determined characteristics, particularly
for the 1977 and 1982 cohort.
All in all it appears that different identification strategies work for dif-
ferent cohorts. In particular, when restricting the sample to Swedish born
students, there are no statistically significant differences between surveyed
and non-surveyed students within municipality for the 1977 and 1982 co-
horts (see Tables A.6 and A.11). Controlling for school size and restricting
the sample to the bigger municipalities, there are no statistically significant
differences between students in sampled and non-sampled schools for the
1972 and 1982 cohorts (see Tables A.4 and A.13).
4 Empirical Results
This section presents the empirical results. We observe complete educational
spells from the last year of compulsory schooling (9th grade) as well as
individual employment status and earnings throughout the early careers. We
focus on shorter- and longer-term outcomes. The short-term outcomes are
9th grade GPA, and indicators for whether advanced Math and English were
chosen in 9th grade for the 72 and 77 cohort, while the short-term outcomes
for the 82 cohort are the individual grades in 9th grade Math, English, and
Swedish.14 The long-term outcomes include highest completed educational
attainment as well as average earnings and days unemployed during the
year when the individuals are 28-31. Tables B.1 to B.9 in Appendix B
display the empirical results for each of the cohorts, and each of the four
empirical strategies. Each table presents estimates of the “survey effect” on
a short- and a long-term index in order to assess whether the survey had
any effect on educational choices and subsequent outcomes. These indices
are constructed by standardizing each variable that enters the index to the
control mean and standard deviation, and then taking the average of the
standardized variables with signs such that larger is better. For the within-
school strategy, indices are constructed at the school level; i.e. the control
13Whether parents divorced is also related to student mobility and may even be related to
student educational outcomes. In future versions of the paper, we plan to explore the
importance of this and other mobility channels further as we have data on the timing of
parental divorce and the timing of migration – in and out of Sweden as well as between
Swedish municipalities.
14The short-term outcomes differ across cohorts because of institutional changes in schools
and data availability. Bjorklund et al. (2005) provide more details on these institutional
changes that also drive the increased number of schools for the youngest cohort.
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group is the students who have not been sampled in each school.15
We focus for each cohort on the specifications that pass the robustness
tests, and conclude that there is overall no effect of the survey on short and
long-term effects, for both students with low and highly educated families.
We find no effect of the treatment on the main indices and their components
for the 1972 cohort (between-school specification, Tables B.2 and B.3), and
for the 1982 cohort (within-municipality specification, Table B.7). However
we do find some reduction in unemployment days for surveyed students from
low-education families for the 1972 cohort (within-municipality specification,
Table ??), and an increase in the graduation rate from short-college for the
1982 cohort for students with educated parents (between-school specifica-
tion, Table B.8). The latter result is not consistent with what we find with
the within-municipality specification, but the two samples are not directly
comparable due to the different restrictions.
4.1 Future directions
To understand whether, beyond the general zero effect, there actually is an
heterogeneous effect of being surveyed, we need to consider the problem of
multiple hypothesis testing. In the next step of the analysis we will use the
testing procedure outlined in List et al. (2016), which builds on the step-
wise testing procedures developed in Romano and Wolf (2005a,b, 2010) and
extended to heterogeneous treatment effects by Lee and Shaikh (2014) in
the context of the PROGRESA program.16 This testing procedure asymp-
totically controls for the familywise error rate (i.e. the probability of one
false rejection) and is asymptotically balanced such that all marginal prob-
abilities of rejecting any true null hypothesis are approximately equal. This
testing procedure has better power properties as it incorporates information
on the joint dependence structure of the test statistics when determining
which null hypotheses to reject. Thus at a significance level of α, all re-
jected null hypothesis are actually false with probability 1 − α. We will
use this procedure to adjust the standard errors when making inference for
multiple outcomes (four short- and six long-term) and multiple subgroups
(low and high parental education).
Secondly, we might be finding a zero effect of being surveyed for the
simple reason that our surveys were assigned after students had taken im-
portant choices (elective courses, high school enrollment and track choice).
15This way of constructing outcome indices builds on Kling et al. (2007).
16Chapter 15 in Lehmann and Romano (2006) provides an overview of these testing pro-
cedures. Similar adjustments for multiple testing have been made in recent analysis of
the HighScope Perry Preschool Program (Heckman et al., 2010, 2011, 2013), Anderson
(2008) who analyzes early childhood interventions, and Kling et al. (2007) who analyze
the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment when drawing inference about the effect
of the program on multiple outcomes using closely related results on stepwise multiple
hypothesis testing developed in Westfall and Young (1993).
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In future versions of this paper, we will focus on whether the parent survey
had an impact on the education choices of non-surveyed siblings. We will
present separate estimates for siblings who were ordained to attend grades
g = 10, 11, 12 (17-19 years old) and thus high school bound. These siblings
are at a critical junction on their schooling trajectory. Thus they may be
particularly sensitive to the influence of their parents becoming more aware
of the importance of schooling.
Thirdly, to investigate potential spillover effects we will provide separate
estimates for non-surveyed siblings who are attending compulsory schooling
grades g = 1, 2, ..., 9 (7-16 years old) when their parent was administered a
survey (at random) because they had a sibling in one of the ETF cohorts.
5 Conclusion
Most empirical advances in the social and health sciences over the past
decades have depended crucially on the use of survey data. If surveying
individuals draws their attention to risks, returns, or choices previously not
salient to them and this changes their subsequent behavior, then it may bias
parameter estimates and conclusions drawn from survey data.
We assess whether surveys causally changed educational choices and
outcomes of students attending compulsory school in Sweden in the 80s and
early 90s. We do not find strong reasons to worry about extensive surveying
changing educational choices and subsequent outcomes. This is reassuring
for both the external and internal validity of estimates based on (this) survey
data.
There are, however, some cases for which the survey increased educa-
tional attainment and job stability of the surveyed individuals (and their
schoolmates) in the early career. This implies that we should be cautious
when administering extensive education surveys, since the surveys them-
selves may change the very behavior they are designed to study. More
research is required to quantify the potential biases this change in behavior
may entail for parameter estimates obtained from (this) survey data. After
properly correcting for multiple hypothesis testing, we will analyze hetero-
geneity in survey effects. To further get at mechanisms, we will extend our
analysis to the siblings of the surveyed students – for whom parental sur-
veys might have revealed information at critical junctions on their schooling
trajectory.
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A Balancing Tests
A.1 1972 Cohort
Table A.1:
Differences in student background by treatment status:
Within-school and municipality specifications
1972 cohort - All students
Control T-C difference T-C difference
Variable mean with school FE with munic FE Cohen’s d
(sd) (sd) (sd)
female 0.49 -0.00 -0.00 0.01
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Foreign born 0.05 -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.11
(0.21) (0.00) (0.00)
Swedish born, foreign parent 0.12 -0.00 -0.00 0.06
(0.32) (0.01) (0.01)
Divorced parent 0.26 -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.18
(0.44) (0.01) (0.01)
Father disposable income 153.19 2.27 2.89 0.06
(51.60) (1.53) (2.02)
Mother disposable income 94.53 -1.32 -1.10 0.26
(49.58) (1.03) (1.10)
Father with low SES 0.35 0.02 0.01 -0.12
(0.48) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with medium SES 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.02
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with high SES 0.23 -0.02* -0.01 0.12
(0.42) (0.01) (0.02)
Father educ: high school 0.44 -0.02* -0.02* 0.03
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: college 0.26 -0.01 -0.00 0.13
(0.44) (0.01) (0.01)
Father: in the labor force 0.93 0.01** 0.01* -0.09
(0.26) (0.00) (0.00)
Mother with low SES 0.36 0.00 0.00 -0.18
(0.48) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with medium SES 0.52 0.01 0.00 0.10
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with high SES 0.12 -0.01 -0.00 0.12
(0.33) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: high school 0.42 0.00 0.00 -0.06
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: college 0.29 -0.01 -0.01 0.14
(0.45) (0.01) (0.02)
Mother: in the labor force 0.93 0.01** 0.01** -0.04
(0.26) (0.00) (0.00)
Hotelling’s T-squared 412.61
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Column 2 and 3 test for differences respectively within school and munici-
pality. No sample restriction. Controls: none. Prices adjusted to 2014: SEK
1 = EUR 0.11 = USD 0.13. Standard errors clustered at the school level.
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Table A.2:
Differences in student background by treatment status:
Within-school and municipality specifications
1972 cohort - Swedish born
Control T-C difference T-C difference
Variable mean with school FE with munic FE Cohen’s d
(sd) (sd) (sd)
female 0.49 -0.00 -0.01 0.01
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Foreign born 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11
(0.00)
Swedish born, foreign parent 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06
(0.00)
Divorced parent 0.24 -0.04*** -0.03*** 0.18
(0.43) (0.01) (0.01)
Father disposable income 157.15 2.26 2.70 0.06
(51.50) (1.59) (1.92)
Mother disposable income 92.37 -2.27** -1.91 0.26
(50.15) (1.06) (1.17)
Father with low SES 0.33 0.02* 0.01 -0.12
(0.47) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with medium SES 0.43 -0.00 -0.00 0.02
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with high SES 0.24 -0.02* -0.01 0.12
(0.43) (0.01) (0.02)
Father educ: high school 0.44 -0.02 -0.02 0.03
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: college 0.28 -0.02** -0.01 0.13
(0.45) (0.01) (0.02)
Father: in the labor force 0.95 0.01 0.01 -0.09
(0.22) (0.00) (0.00)
Mother with low SES 0.33 0.00 0.00 -0.18
(0.47) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with medium SES 0.54 0.01 0.00 0.10
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with high SES 0.13 -0.01 -0.00 0.12
(0.33) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: high school 0.43 0.00 0.01 -0.06
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: college 0.30 -0.01 -0.01 0.14
(0.46) (0.01) (0.02)
Mother: in the labor force 0.95 0.01* 0.01 -0.04
(0.22) (0.00) (0.00)
Hotelling’s T-squared 339.25
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Column 2 and 3 test for differences respectively within school and municipality.
Sample restricted to Swedish born students. Controls: none. Prices adjusted to
2014: 1 SEK = 0.11 ¿. Standard errors clustered at the school level.
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Table A.3:
Differences in student background by treatment assignment:
Between-school specification
1972 cohort - All students
Control Difference Difference
Variable Mean w/o controls w/ controls Cohen’s d
(sd) (sd) (sd)
female 0.49 0.00 -0.01 -0.00
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Foreign born 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.09
(0.24) (0.01) (0.01)
Swedish born, foreign parent 0.14 -0.01 -0.01 0.12
(0.34) (0.01) (0.01)
Divorced parent 0.29 -0.01 0.00 0.17
(0.45) (0.02) (0.02)
Father disposable income 153.82 8.07** 4.17 0.05
(54.89) (3.73) (3.81)
Mother disposable income 101.29 1.33 1.60 0.29
(51.82) (1.93) (1.92)
Father with low SES 0.36 -0.07** -0.03 -0.05
(0.48) (0.03) (0.03)
Father with medium SES 0.42 -0.01 -0.01 0.02
(0.49) (0.02) (0.02)
Father with high SES 0.22 0.07** 0.04 0.04
(0.42) (0.03) (0.03)
Father educ: high school 0.44 -0.04** -0.04** 0.03
(0.50) (0.02) (0.02)
Father educ: college 0.25 0.09*** 0.06* 0.04
(0.44) (0.03) (0.03)
Father: in the labor force 0.92 -0.00 -0.01 -0.07
(0.27) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with low SES 0.32 -0.04 -0.01 -0.19
(0.47) (0.03) (0.03)
Mother with medium SES 0.55 -0.01 -0.02 0.14
(0.50) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother with high SES 0.13 0.04** 0.03* 0.08
(0.33) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother educ: high school 0.43 -0.04** -0.03** -0.02
(0.49) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother educ: college 0.29 0.07** 0.04 0.08
(0.46) (0.03) (0.03)
Mother: in the labor force 0.92 0.01 0.00 -0.04
(0.27) (0.01) (0.01)
Hotelling’s T-squared 316.12
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
No sample restriction. The specification with controls includes a control
for school size. Prices adjusted to 2014: SEK 1 = EUR 0.11 = USD
0.13. Standard errors clustered at the school level.
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Table A.4:
Differences in student background by treatment assignment:
Between-school specification
1972 cohort - Restricted sample
Control Difference Difference
Variable Mean w/o controls w/ controls Cohen’s d
(sd) (sd) (sd)
female 0.49 0.00 -0.01 -0.00
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Foreign born 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.09
(0.24) (0.01) (0.01)
Swedish born, foreign parent 0.14 -0.01 -0.01 0.12
(0.35) (0.01) (0.01)
Divorced parent 0.29 -0.02 0.01 0.17
(0.45) (0.02) (0.02)
Father disposable income 153.56 9.18** 4.33 0.05
(55.47) (4.05) (4.49)
Mother disposable income 101.99 1.00 2.34 0.29
(52.00) (2.14) (2.08)
Father with low SES 0.36 -0.08** -0.03 -0.05
(0.48) (0.03) (0.03)
Father with medium SES 0.42 -0.01 -0.01 0.02
(0.49) (0.02) (0.02)
Father with high SES 0.22 0.09*** 0.04 0.04
(0.41) (0.03) (0.03)
Father educ: high school 0.44 -0.04** -0.03 0.03
(0.50) (0.02) (0.02)
Father educ: college 0.25 0.10*** 0.06 0.04
(0.43) (0.04) (0.04)
Father: in the labor force 0.91 0.00 -0.01 -0.07
(0.28) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with low SES 0.33 -0.05* -0.02 -0.19
(0.47) (0.03) (0.03)
Mother with medium SES 0.54 0.01 -0.01 0.14
(0.50) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother with high SES 0.13 0.05** 0.03 0.08
(0.34) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother educ: high school 0.43 -0.04** -0.02 -0.02
(0.49) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother educ: college 0.29 0.08** 0.04 0.08
(0.45) (0.04) (0.04)
Mother: in the labor force 0.92 0.01 0.00 -0.04
(0.27) (0.01) (0.01)
Hotelling’s T-squared 95.98
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Sample restricted to municipalities where less than 85% of the students
are in sampled schools. The specification with controls includes a control
for school size. Prices adjusted to 2014: SEK 1 = EUR 0.11 = USD
0.13. Standard errors clustered at the school level.
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A.2 1977 Cohort
Table A.5:
Differences in student background by treatment status:
Within-school and municipality specifications
1977 cohort - All students
Control T-C difference T-C difference
Variable mean with school FE with munic FE Cohen’s d
(sd) (sd) (sd)
female 0.49 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Foreign born 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.07
(0.22) (0.00) (0.00)
Swedish born, foreign parent 0.11 -0.00 -0.00 0.08
(0.31) (0.01) (0.01)
Divorced parent 0.19 -0.02*** -0.02** 0.13
(0.39) (0.01) (0.01)
Father disposable income 180.32 -1.37 -1.26 0.07
(84.83) (1.72) (1.93)
Mother disposable income 130.29 -0.97 0.24 0.14
(51.10) (1.15) (1.12)
Father with low SES 0.37 0.01 -0.00 -0.08
(0.48) (0.01) (0.02)
Father with medium SES 0.40 0.01 0.01 -0.02
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with high SES 0.23 -0.02 -0.01 0.12
(0.42) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: high school 0.43 0.00 -0.00 -0.02
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: college 0.29 -0.01 -0.00 0.10
(0.45) (0.01) (0.01)
Father: in the labor force 0.95 0.00 0.00 -0.07
(0.22) (0.00) (0.00)
Mother with low SES 0.37 0.03** 0.02 -0.12
(0.48) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with medium SES 0.51 -0.03** -0.02 0.06
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with high SES 0.12 -0.01 0.00 0.09
(0.32) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: high school 0.44 0.00 -0.00 -0.06
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: college 0.31 -0.01 -0.00 0.09
(0.46) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother: in the labor force 0.94 0.00 0.00 -0.04
(0.24) (0.00) (0.00)
Hotelling’s T-squared 104.80
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Column 2 and 3 test for differences respectively within school and municipality.
No sample restriction. Controls: none. Prices adjusted to 2014: SEK 1 = EUR
0.11 = USD 0.13. Standard errors clustered at the school level.
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Table A.6:
Differences in student background by treatment status:
Within-school and municipality specifications
1977 cohort - Swedish born
Control T-C difference T-C difference
Variable mean with school FE with munic FE Cohen’s d
(sd) (sd) (sd)
female 0.48 0.01 0.01 -0.00
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Foreign born 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07
(0.00)
Swedish born, foreign parent 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08
(0.00)
Divorced parent 0.17 -0.02** -0.01 0.13
(0.37) (0.01) (0.01)
Father disposable income 187.29 -2.29 -1.54 0.07
(86.59) (1.65) (1.80)
Mother disposable income 127.81 -0.71 0.25 0.14
(49.56) (1.30) (1.25)
Father with low SES 0.35 0.01 -0.00 -0.08
(0.48) (0.01) (0.02)
Father with medium SES 0.41 0.01 0.01 -0.02
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with high SES 0.24 -0.02 -0.01 0.12
(0.43) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: high school 0.43 0.01 0.00 -0.02
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: college 0.30 -0.02 -0.00 0.10
(0.46) (0.01) (0.01)
Father: in the labor force 0.97 0.00 0.00 -0.07
(0.18) (0.00) (0.00)
Mother with low SES 0.34 0.02* 0.01 -0.12
(0.47) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with medium SES 0.54 -0.02 -0.01 0.06
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with high SES 0.12 -0.00 0.00 0.09
(0.33) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: high school 0.45 0.00 0.00 -0.06
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: college 0.32 -0.01 0.00 0.09
(0.47) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother: in the labor force 0.95 0.01 0.01 -0.04
(0.21) (0.01) (0.00)
Hotelling’s T-squared 95.07
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Column 2 and 3 test for differences respectively within school and municipality.
Sample restricted to Swedish born students. Controls: none. Prices adjusted to
2014: 1 SEK = 0.11 ¿. Standard errors clustered at the school level.
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Table A.7:
Differences in student background by treatment assignment:
Between-school specification
1977 cohort - All students
Control Difference Difference
Variable Mean w/o controls w/ controls Cohen’s d
(sd) (sd) (sd)
female 0.49 -0.01 -0.01 0.02
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Foreign born 0.07 0.02* 0.03** 0.07
(0.25) (0.01) (0.01)
Swedish born, foreign parent 0.13 -0.02** -0.01* 0.14
(0.34) (0.01) (0.01)
Divorced parent 0.21 0.02 0.03* 0.10
(0.40) (0.01) (0.01)
Father disposable income 182.74 -0.12 -5.05 0.08
(97.43) (5.38) (5.48)
Mother disposable income 134.87 3.59** 2.87 0.19
(52.91) (1.79) (1.85)
Father with low SES 0.35 -0.01 0.01 -0.12
(0.48) (0.03) (0.03)
Father with medium SES 0.39 0.00 -0.00 -0.02
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with high SES 0.26 0.01 -0.01 0.17
(0.44) (0.02) (0.02)
Father educ: high school 0.42 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03
(0.49) (0.02) (0.02)
Father educ: college 0.32 0.02 0.00 0.14
(0.47) (0.03) (0.03)
Father: in the labor force 0.94 -0.00 -0.01 -0.08
(0.24) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with low SES 0.34 -0.02 0.01 -0.15
(0.47) (0.03) (0.03)
Mother with medium SES 0.52 -0.00 -0.01 0.07
(0.50) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother with high SES 0.14 0.02 0.01 0.12
(0.34) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother educ: high school 0.42 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08
(0.49) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother educ: college 0.34 0.01 -0.01 0.15
(0.47) (0.03) (0.03)
Mother: in the labor force 0.93 0.00 -0.01 -0.05
(0.25) (0.01) (0.01)
Hotelling’s T-squared 362.49
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
No sample restriction. The specification with controls includes a control
for school size. Prices adjusted to 2014: SEK 1 = EUR 0.11 = USD
0.13. Standard errors clustered at the school level.
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Table A.8:
Differences in student background by treatment assignment:
Between-school specification
1977 cohort - Restricted sample
Control Difference Difference
Variable Mean w/o controls w/ controls Cohen’s d
(sd) (sd) (sd)
female 0.49 -0.01 -0.01 0.02
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Foreign born 0.07 0.02* 0.03** 0.07
(0.25) (0.01) (0.01)
Swedish born, foreign parent 0.13 -0.02** -0.01 0.14
(0.34) (0.01) (0.01)
Divorced parent 0.20 0.02 0.03** 0.10
(0.40) (0.02) (0.02)
Father disposable income 182.96 -0.80 -6.64 0.08
(97.94) (5.66) (5.81)
Mother disposable income 135.02 3.65* 2.89 0.19
(53.01) (1.87) (1.96)
Father with low SES 0.35 -0.01 0.02 -0.12
(0.48) (0.03) (0.03)
Father with medium SES 0.39 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with high SES 0.26 0.01 -0.01 0.17
(0.44) (0.02) (0.03)
Father educ: high school 0.42 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03
(0.49) (0.02) (0.02)
Father educ: college 0.32 0.02 -0.00 0.14
(0.47) (0.03) (0.03)
Father: in the labor force 0.94 -0.00 -0.01 -0.08
(0.24) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with low SES 0.34 -0.02 0.01 -0.15
(0.47) (0.03) (0.03)
Mother with medium SES 0.52 0.00 -0.01 0.07
(0.50) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother with high SES 0.14 0.02 0.01 0.12
(0.35) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother educ: high school 0.41 -0.01 -0.00 -0.08
(0.49) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother educ: college 0.34 0.01 -0.02 0.15
(0.47) (0.03) (0.03)
Mother: in the labor force 0.93 -0.00 -0.01 -0.05
(0.25) (0.01) (0.01)
Hotelling’s T-squared 230.56
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Sample restricted to municipalities where less than 85% of the students
are in sampled schools. The specification with controls includes a control
for school size. Prices adjusted to 2014: SEK 1 = EUR 0.11 = USD
0.13. Standard errors clustered at the school level.
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A.3 1982 Cohort
Table A.9:
Differences in student background by treatment status:
Within-school and municipality specifications
1982 cohort - All students
Control T-C difference T-C difference
Variable mean with school FE with munic FE Cohen’s d
(sd) (sd) (sd)
female 0.50 -0.00 -0.00 0.01
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Foreign born 0.08 -0.01 -0.01 0.07
(0.27) (0.00) (0.01)
Swedish born, foreign parent 0.11 0.01** 0.01* 0.01
(0.32) (0.01) (0.01)
Divorced parent 0.13 -0.01** -0.01** 0.07
(0.33) (0.01) (0.00)
Father disposable income 207.58 4.90 5.34* 0.02
(145.45) (3.05) (3.03)
Mother disposable income 163.27 -0.80 -1.69 0.10
(73.34) (1.07) (1.29)
Father with low SES 0.36 -0.03*** -0.01 -0.09
(0.48) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with medium SES 0.39 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with high SES 0.25 0.02** 0.01 0.09
(0.43) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: high school 0.41 -0.00 0.00 -0.06
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: college 0.36 0.02** 0.01 0.10
(0.48) (0.01) (0.01)
Father: in the labor force 0.94 0.01** 0.01** -0.06
(0.24) (0.00) (0.00)
Mother with low SES 0.37 -0.00 0.01 -0.12
(0.48) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with medium SES 0.49 0.00 -0.00 0.05
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with high SES 0.14 0.00 -0.00 0.10
(0.35) (0.01) (0.00)
Mother educ: high school 0.42 0.01 0.01** -0.09
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: college 0.36 0.02** 0.01 0.09
(0.48) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother: in the labor force 0.91 0.01** 0.01* -0.03
(0.28) (0.01) (0.01)
Hotelling’s T-squared 147.77
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Column 2 and 3 test for differences respectively within school and municipality.
No sample restriction. Controls: none. Prices adjusted to 2014: SEK 1 = EUR
0.11 = USD 0.13. Standard errors clustered at the school level.
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Table A.10: Differences in student background by treatment status:
Within-school and municipality specifications
1982 cohort - Same municipality in grades 3 and 9
Control T-C difference T-C difference
Variable mean with school FE with munic FE Cohen’s d
(sd) (sd) (sd)
female 0.49 -0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Foreign born 0.07 -0.00 -0.00 0.07
(0.26) (0.00) (0.01)
Swedish born, foreign parent 0.11 0.01** 0.01* 0.01
(0.31) (0.01) (0.00)
Divorced parent 0.12 -0.01 -0.01 0.07
(0.33) (0.01) (0.01)
Father disposable income 207.85 3.96 5.31 0.02
(146.67) (3.17) (3.42)
Mother disposable income 163.32 -0.58 -1.40 0.10
(73.90) (1.11) (1.34)
Father with low SES 0.36 -0.03** -0.01 -0.09
(0.48) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with medium SES 0.40 0.00 -0.00 0.01
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with high SES 0.24 0.02** 0.01* 0.09
(0.43) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: high school 0.41 0.00 0.01 -0.06
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: college 0.36 0.02* 0.01 0.10
(0.48) (0.01) (0.01)
Father: in the labor force 0.94 0.01* 0.01** -0.06
(0.23) (0.00) (0.00)
Mother with low SES 0.37 -0.00 0.01 -0.12
(0.48) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with medium SES 0.49 0.00 -0.01 0.05
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with high SES 0.14 -0.00 -0.00 0.10
(0.34) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: high school 0.42 0.01 0.01* -0.09
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: college 0.37 0.02* 0.01 0.09
(0.48) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother: in the labor force 0.92 0.01 0.01 -0.03
(0.27) (0.01) (0.00)
Hotelling’s T-squared 125.65
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Column 2 and 3 test for differences respectively within school and municipality.
Sample restricted to students living in the same municipality in grade 3 and
9. Controls: none. Prices adjusted to 2014: SEK 1 = EUR 0.11 = USD 0.13.
Standard errors clustered at the school level.
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Table A.11:
Differences in student background by treatment status:
Within-school and municipality specifications
1982 cohort - Swedish born, same municipality in grades 3 and 9
Control T-C difference T-C difference
Variable mean with school FE with munic FE Cohen’s d
(sd) (sd) (sd)
female 0.49 -0.00 -0.00 0.01
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Foreign born 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07
(0.00)
Swedish born, foreign parent 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.00)
Divorced parent 0.10 -0.01 -0.00 0.07
(0.30) (0.01) (0.01)
Father disposable income 221.39 3.88 4.64 0.02
(161.17) (3.49) (4.06)
Mother disposable income 163.96 -0.98 -1.92 0.10
(63.77) (1.20) (1.70)
Father with low SES 0.33 -0.02** -0.00 -0.09
(0.47) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with medium SES 0.41 0.00 -0.00 0.01
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with high SES 0.26 0.02** 0.01 0.09
(0.44) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: high school 0.41 0.01 0.01 -0.06
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: college 0.39 0.01 -0.01 0.10
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father: in the labor force 0.97 0.00 0.00 -0.06
(0.17) (0.00) (0.00)
Mother with low SES 0.34 0.01 0.02 -0.12
(0.47) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with medium SES 0.52 -0.01 -0.01 0.05
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with high SES 0.14 0.00 -0.01 0.10
(0.35) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: high school 0.44 0.01 0.01 -0.09
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: college 0.39 0.01 -0.00 0.09
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother: in the labor force 0.95 0.00 0.00 -0.03
(0.21) (0.00) (0.00)
Hotelling’s T-squared 132.18
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Column 2 and 3 test for differences respectively within school and municipality.
Sample restricted to Swedish born students living in the same municipality in
grade 3 and 9. Controls: none. Prices adjusted to 2014: SEK 1 = EUR 0.11 =
USD 0.13. Standard errors clustered at the school level.
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Table A.12:
Differences in student background by treatment assignment:
Between-school specification
1982 cohort - All students
Control Difference Difference
Variable Mean w/o controls w/ controls Cohen’s d
(sd) (sd) (sd)
female 0.49 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Foreign born 0.11 -0.02* -0.01 0.09
(0.31) (0.01) (0.01)
Swedish born, foreign parent 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.04
(0.32) (0.01) (0.01)
Divorced parent 0.14 -0.01* -0.01 0.08
(0.35) (0.01) (0.01)
Father disposable income 209.29 5.54 2.32 0.03
(222.75) (6.58) (6.37)
Mother disposable income 165.49 0.54 -0.45 0.09
(68.36) (1.63) (1.51)
Father with low SES 0.37 -0.04* -0.02 -0.03
(0.48) (0.02) (0.02)
Father with medium SES 0.38 0.01 0.01 -0.03
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with high SES 0.25 0.02 0.01 0.06
(0.43) (0.02) (0.02)
Father educ: high school 0.40 -0.00 0.00 -0.04
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: college 0.36 0.03 0.02 0.05
(0.48) (0.02) (0.02)
Father: in the labor force 0.93 0.01 0.00 -0.06
(0.26) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with low SES 0.37 -0.02 -0.00 -0.07
(0.48) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother with medium SES 0.48 0.01 0.00 0.02
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with high SES 0.15 0.01 0.00 0.08
(0.36) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: high school 0.40 0.01 0.02 -0.08
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: college 0.37 0.02 0.01 0.06
(0.48) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother: in the labor force 0.90 0.02** 0.01 -0.05
(0.30) (0.01) (0.01)
Hotelling’s T-squared 104.99
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Between-school specification. No sample restriction. The specification
with controls includes a control for school size. Prices adjusted to 2014:
SEK 1 = EUR 0.11 = USD 0.13. Standard errors clustered at the school
level.
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Table A.13:
Differences in student background by treatment assignment:
Between-school specification
1982 cohort - Restricted sample
Control Difference Difference
Variable Mean w/o controls w/ controls Cohen’s d
(sd) (sd) (sd)
female 0.49 0.01 0.01 -0.00
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Foreign born 0.10 -0.02 -0.01 0.09
(0.31) (0.01) (0.01)
Swedish born, foreign parent 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.04
(0.32) (0.01) (0.01)
Divorced parent 0.14 -0.01 -0.01 0.08
(0.35) (0.01) (0.01)
Father disposable income 209.68 5.41 3.02 0.03
(226.56) (6.94) (6.66)
Mother disposable income 165.68 0.52 -0.25 0.09
(68.88) (1.69) (1.56)
Father with low SES 0.37 -0.04* -0.03 -0.03
(0.48) (0.02) (0.02)
Father with medium SES 0.38 0.02 0.01 -0.03
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with high SES 0.25 0.03 0.01 0.06
(0.43) (0.02) (0.02)
Father educ: high school 0.40 -0.00 0.00 -0.04
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: college 0.36 0.04 0.02 0.05
(0.48) (0.02) (0.02)
Father: in the labor force 0.93 0.01 0.01 -0.06
(0.26) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with low SES 0.37 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07
(0.48) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother with medium SES 0.49 0.01 0.00 0.02
(0.50) (0.02) (0.01)
Mother with high SES 0.15 0.01 0.00 0.08
(0.36) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: high school 0.40 0.01 0.01 -0.08
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: college 0.37 0.03 0.01 0.06
(0.48) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother: in the labor force 0.90 0.02* 0.01 -0.05
(0.31) (0.01) (0.01)
Hotelling’s T-squared 41.35
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Between-school specification. Sample restricted to municipalities where
less than 85% of the students are in sampled schools. The specification
with controls includes a control for school size. Prices adjusted to 2014:
SEK 1 = EUR 0.11 = USD 0.13. Standard errors clustered at the school
level.
37
B Results
B.1 1972 Cohort
Table B.1: Effect of surveys: Within-municipality specification
1972 cohort - Swedish born
Sample All High Education Low Education
Controls No Full controls No Full controls No Full controls
Short-term index (std munic) 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Swedish grade (grade 9, 0-100) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Math grade (grade 9, 0-100) -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
English grade (grade 9, 0-100) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GPA (grade 9, 0-100) 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01** 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Long-term index (std munic) 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.05*** 0.03*
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Short high school (age 31) -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
High school (age 31) 0.00 -0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.03*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Short college (age 31) 0.01** 0.02** 0.01 0.01 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
College (age 31) 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.03*** 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Gross income (27-31 yrs old) 4.53 -13.26 -13.31 -28.81 43.30 1.97
(25.15) (21.55) (44.33) (37.55) (28.94) (30.17)
Days/year unemp. (27-31 yrs old) -1.29 -0.79 -1.33 -1.06 -1.46* -0.68
(0.92) (0.93) (1.33) (1.34) (0.85) (0.87)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table presents coefficient and standard error from the regression of each row outcome
on a dummy for “being surveyed”, including municipality fixed effects. The main outcomes
are standardized indices for short-term educational attainment and long-term educational
attainment and labor market performance. Effects on each component of the index are
presented below the index row. GPA is on a 0-5 scale. Income is expressed in 100 SEK,
and prices are adjusted to 2014: SEK 1 = EUR 0.11 = USD 0.13. The sample is restricted
to Swedish born students with Swedish parents. Standard errors clustered at the school
level.
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Table B.2: Effect of assignment to sampled school:
1972 cohort - Restricted sample
Sample All High Education Low Education
Controls School size Full controls School size Full controls School size Full controls
Short-term index (std munic) 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.05 -0.04
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
Swedish grade (grade 9, 0-100) 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Math grade (grade 9, 0-100) -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
English grade (grade 9, 0-100) 0.01** 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
GPA (grade 9, 0-100) 0.00 -0.01** 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Long-term index (std munic) 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01** -0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03)
Short high school (age 31) -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
High school (age 31) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Short college (age 31) -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
College (age 31) 0.01*** -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Gross income (27-31 yrs old) 35.87 13.10 87.09 68.17* -64.43 -65.06*
(32.13) (2.61) (27.59) (10.28) (27.45) (6.18)
Days/year unemp. (27-31 yrs old) 0.59 0.64 1.52 1.54 -0.28 -0.43**
(0.72) (0.66) (1.72) (1.58) (0.25) (0.02)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table presents coefficient and standard error from the regression of each row outcome
on aa dummy for “studying in a sampled school”. The main outcomes are standardized
indices for short-term educational choices and attainment, and long-term educational at-
tainment and labor market performance. Effects on each component of the index are
presented below the index row. All specifications control for school size. Specifications
in the “Control” column include controls for family background and parental education.
GPA is on a 0-5 scale. Income is expressed in 100 SEK, and prices are adjusted to 2014:
SEK 1 = EUR 0.11 = USD 0.13. The sample is restricted to municipalities where less
than 85% of the students have been sampled. Standard errors clustered at the school level.
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Table B.3: Effect of being surveyed in school:
1972 cohort - Restricted sample
Sample All High Education Low Education
Controls School size Full controls School size Full controls School size Full controls
Short-term index (std munic) 0.02 -0.09 -0.00 -0.07 -0.14 -0.10
(0.12) (0.07) (0.17) (0.14) (0.03) (0.08)
Swedish grade (grade 9, 0-100) -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02**
(0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.01) (0.00)
Math grade (grade 9, 0-100) -0.01 -0.03 -0.02* -0.03** -0.03 -0.03
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.05)
English grade (grade 9, 0-100) 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
GPA (grade 9, 0-100) -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04* -0.03
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Long-term index (std munic) 0.09*** -0.02** 0.08 0.00 -0.03 -0.06
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Short high school (age 31) -0.04 -0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.02
(0.01) (0.00) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11)
High school (age 31) -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.10) (0.10)
Short college (age 31) 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
College (age 31) 0.02 -0.03** -0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02
(0.02) (0.00) (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12)
Gross income (27-31 yrs old) 251.15 78.97** 390.15 249.47** -40.18 -167.02*
(82.12) (2.34) (99.56) (9.65) (29.15) (14.08)
Days/year unemp. (27-31 yrs old) -0.99 0.40 1.60 2.50 -3.89 -2.44
(1.03) (0.79) (1.37) (1.43) (3.42) (2.22)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table presents coefficient and standard error from the regression of each row outcome
on a variable measuring the fraction of the school-cohort surveyed. The main outcomes
are standardized indices for short-term educational choices and attainment, and long-
term educational attainment and labor market performance. Effects on each component
of the index are presented below the index row. All specifications control for school size.
Specifications in the “Control” column include controls for family background and parental
education. GPA is on a 0-5 scale. Income is expressed in 100 SEK, and prices are adjusted
to 2014: SEK 1 = EUR 0.11 = USD 0.13. The sample is restricted to municipalities where
less than 85% of the students have been sampled. Standard errors clustered at the school
level.
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Table B.4: Effect of surveys: Within-school specification
1972 cohort - Swedish born
Sample All High Education Low Education
Controls No Full controls No Full controls No Full controls
Short-term index (std school) 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Swedish grade (grade 9, 0-100) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Math grade (grade 9, 0-100) 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
English grade (grade 9, 0-100) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GPA (grade 9, 0-100) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01* 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Long-term index (std school) 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.05** 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Short high school (age 31) -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
High school (age 31) -0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02* -0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Short college (age 31) 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01 0.01 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
College (age 31) 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.02* 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Gross income (27-31 yrs old) 7.89 -6.52 -21.85 -35.10 69.21** 39.58
(26.09) (25.16) (40.80) (40.90) (34.58) (32.69)
Days/year unemp. (27-31 yrs old) -1.94** -1.34* -2.28** -1.90* -1.77 -0.82
(0.76) (0.74) (1.03) (1.07) (1.15) (1.16)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table presents coefficient and standard error from the regression of each row outcome
on a dummy for “being surveyed”, including school fixed effects. The main outcomes
are standardized indices for short-term educational attainment and long-term educational
attainment and labor market performance. Effects on each component of the index are
presented below the index row. GPA is on a 0-5 scale. Income is expressed in 100 SEK,
and prices are adjusted to 2014: SEK 1 = EUR 0.11 = USD 0.13. The sample is restricted
to Swedish born students with Swedish parents. Standard errors clustered at the school
level.
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B.2 1977 Cohort
Table B.5: Effect of surveys: Within-municipality specification
1977 cohort - All students
Sample All High Education Low Education
Controls No Full controls No Full controls No Full controls
Short-term index (std munic) -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.04* -0.05**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Swedish grade (grade 9, 0-100) -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Math grade (grade 9, 0-100) -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
English grade (grade 9, 0-100) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GPA (grade 9, 0-100) -0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Long-term index (std munic) 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Short high school (age 31) -0.00 -0.00 -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
High school (age 31) 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Short college (age 31) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
College (age 31) -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Gross income (27-31 yrs old) -3.82 0.83 20.96 25.38 -31.03 -32.50
(26.24) (26.86) (38.74) (39.08) (32.31) (30.43)
Days/year unemp. (27-31 yrs old) -1.24 -1.06 -0.81 -0.54 -1.66 -1.48
(0.83) (0.85) (0.85) (0.86) (1.41) (1.41)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table presents coefficient and standard error from the regression of each row outcome
on a dummy for “being surveyed”, including municipality fixed effects. The main outcomes
are standardized indices for short-term educational attainment and long-term educational
attainment and labor market performance. Effects on each component of the index are
presented below the index row. GPA is on a 0-5 scale. Income is expressed in 100 SEK, and
prices are adjusted to 2014: SEK 1 = EUR 0.11 = USD 0.13. Standard errors clustered
at the school level.
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Table B.6: Effect of surveys: Within-municipality specification
1977 cohort - Swedish born
Sample All High Education Low Education
Controls No Full controls No Full controls No Full controls
Short-term index (std munic) -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.00 -0.04 -0.05**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Swedish grade (grade 9, 0-100) -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01* -0.01**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Math grade (grade 9, 0-100) -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
English grade (grade 9, 0-100) -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GPA (grade 9, 0-100) -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Long-term index (std munic) -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Short high school (age 31) -0.00 -0.00 -0.01* -0.01* 0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
High school (age 31) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Short college (age 31) -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
College (age 31) -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Gross income (27-31 yrs old) -19.61 -8.07 2.46 11.78 -41.88 -32.49
(30.32) (30.88) (43.07) (44.40) (32.95) (27.36)
Days/year unemp. (27-31 yrs old) -0.85 -0.63 -0.83 -0.52 -0.87 -0.66
(0.71) (0.77) (0.82) (0.83) (1.30) (1.41)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table presents coefficient and standard error from the regression of each row outcome
on a dummy for “being surveyed”, including municipality fixed effects. The main outcomes
are standardized indices for short-term educational attainment and long-term educational
attainment and labor market performance. Effects on each component of the index are
presented below the index row. GPA is on a 0-5 scale. Income is expressed in 100 SEK,
and prices are adjusted to 2014: SEK 1 = EUR 0.11 = USD 0.13. The sample is restricted
to Swedish born students with Swedish parents. Standard errors clustered at the school
level.
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B.3 1982 Cohort
Table B.7: Effect of surveys: Within-municipality specification
1982 cohort - Swedish born, same municipality in grades 3 and 9
Sample All High Education Low Education
Controls No Full controls No Full controls No Full controls
Short-term index (std munic) 0.02 0.02 0.03* 0.03** -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Swedish grade (grade 9, 0-100) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Math grade (grade 9, 0-100) 0.01 0.01 0.01** 0.01*** -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
English grade (grade 9, 0-100) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GPA (grade 9, 0-100) 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 0.01** 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Long-term index (std munic) 0.02** 0.02* 0.02** 0.03** 0.01 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Short high school (age 31) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
High school (age 31) -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.03* -0.03*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Short college (age 31) 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
College (age 31) 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Gross income (27-31 yrs old) 27.86 24.37 52.70** 59.36** -13.56 -39.30
(17.47) (17.61) (25.84) (26.42) (28.07) (28.18)
Days/year unemp. (27-31 yrs old) -0.84 -0.68 -0.75 -0.65 -1.03 -0.78
(0.57) (0.62) (0.70) (0.73) (0.81) (0.81)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table presents coefficient and standard error from the regression of each row outcome
on a dummy for “being surveyed”, including municipality fixed effects. The main outcomes
are standardized indices for short-term educational attainment and long-term educational
attainment and labor market performance. Effects on each component of the index are
presented below the index row. Grades are on a 0-4 scale. Income is expressed in 100
SEK, and prices are adjusted to 2014: SEK 1 = EUR 0.11 = USD 0.13. The sample is
restricted to Swedish born students with Swedish parents living in the same municipality
in grades 3 and 9. Standard errors clustered at the school level.
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Table B.8: Effect of assignment to sampled school:
1982 cohort - Restricted sample
Sample All High Education Low Education
Controls School size Full controls School size Full controls School size Full controls
Short-term index (std munic) 0.06** 0.04* 0.07** 0.06** 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Swedish grade (grade 9, 0-100) 0.01 0.01 0.01* 0.01 -0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Math grade (grade 9, 0-100) 0.02*** 0.01** 0.01* 0.01** 0.01** 0.01**
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
English grade (grade 9, 0-100) 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
GPA (grade 9, 0-100) 0.01* 0.01 0.01* 0.01* 0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Long-term index (std munic) 0.04** 0.02* 0.01 0.01 0.05** 0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Short high school (age 31) -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
High school (age 31) -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Short college (age 31) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01** -0.01** -0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
College (age 31) 0.03** 0.02** 0.02 0.02 0.02** 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Gross income (27-31 yrs old) 62.75 47.12 27.00 22.84 112.00** 92.58**
(40.15) (38.60) (47.42) (44.37) (40.59) (39.02)
Days/year unemp. (27-31 yrs old) -0.38 0.09 0.16 0.30 -0.89 -0.24
(0.53) (0.49) (0.58) (0.59) (1.25) (1.15)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table presents coefficient and standard error from the regression of each row outcome
on aa dummy for “studying in a sampled school”. The main outcomes are standardized
indices for short-term educational choices and attainment, and long-term educational at-
tainment and labor market performance. Effects on each component of the index are
presented below the index row. All specifications control for school size. Specifications
in the “Control” column include controls for family background and parental education.
Grades are on a 0-4 scale. Income is expressed in 100 SEK, and prices are adjusted to
2014: SEK 1 = EUR 0.11 = USD 0.13. The sample is restricted to municipalities where
less than 85% of the students have been sampled. Standard errors clustered at the school
level.
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Table B.9: Effect of being surveyed in school:
1982 cohort - Restricted sample
Sample All High Education Low Education
Controls School size Full controls School size Full controls School size Full controls
Short-term index (std munic) 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.07 -0.02 -0.03
(0.11) (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.06) (0.05)
Swedish grade (grade 9, 0-100) 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Math grade (grade 9, 0-100) 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
English grade (grade 9, 0-100) 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
GPA (grade 9, 0-100) 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Long-term index (std munic) 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.05
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.08) (0.06)
Short high school (age 31) -0.02** -0.02** -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
High school (age 31) 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.03
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Short college (age 31) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
College (age 31) 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.04
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Gross income (27-31 yrs old) 66.12 24.20 15.43 -9.03 121.20 85.26
(89.58) (86.49) (111.26) (104.29) (104.67) (101.49)
Days/year unemp. (27-31 yrs old) -1.32 -0.30 -0.25 0.15 -2.41 -1.28
(1.98) (1.59) (1.62) (1.64) (4.24) (3.57)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table presents coefficient and standard error from the regression of each row outcome
on a variable measuring the fraction of the school-cohort surveyed. The main outcomes
are standardized indices for short-term educational choices and attainment, and long-
term educational attainment and labor market performance. Effects on each component
of the index are presented below the index row. All specifications control for school
size. Specifications in the “Control” column include controls for family background and
parental education. Grades are on a 0-4 scale. Income is expressed in 100 SEK, and
prices are adjusted to 2014: SEK 1 = EUR 0.11 = USD 0.13. The sample is restricted to
municipalities where less than 85% of the students have been sampled. Standard errors
clustered at the school level.
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